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The substructure of stasis-theory  
from Hermagoras to Hermogenes  
MALCOLM HEATH (UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS) 
ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the history of the scheme aition, sunekhon, 
krinomenon in the rhetorical theory of stasis (issue-theory). The role of this 
scheme in the theory of Hermagoras of Temnos is reconstructed; it is shown that 
successive changes of position in Cicero's theoretical writings reflect the 
breakdown of Hermagoras' system. Responses to this breakdown in a number of 
later rhetoricians, including Quintilian, Lollianus and Minucianus, are discussed; 
Zeno and Hermogenes abandoned the scheme. 
1. Introduction 
Stasis-theory seeks to classify rhetorical problems (declamation themes, or 
real forensic and deliberative situations) according to the underlying structure of 
the dispute that each involves.
1
 Such a classification is of interest to the practising 
rhetor, since it may help him identify an appropriate argumentative strategy; for 
example, patterns of argument appropriate to a question of fact (did the defendant 
do what is alleged?) may be irrelevant in an evaluative dispute (was the defendant 
justified in doing that?).  
Ancient rhetoricians did not always agree on how to classify a given problem. 
Consider the case of the adulterous eunuch. A husband may kill an adulterer in the 
act; a man finds a eunuch in bed with his wife and kills him; he is charged with 
homicide. According to Hermogenes, the stasis is definition: the facts are agreed, 
and the dispute is about how to categorise those facts.
2
 Whatever the eunuch was 
up to, it was clearly not a fully-fledged instance of adultery; it (and indeed he) 
lacked something arguably essential to that crime. Is this incomplete adultery 
nevertheless to be classed as adultery? If so, then the killing is covered by the law 
on adultery; if not, the killing is unlawful. But the case could also be interpreted 
as counterplea (antilêpsis).
3
 Counterplea is a form of the stasis of quality, in 
which the defence maintains that the act for which it is charged is lawful in itself. 
For example: a rhetors encomium on death is followed by a rash of suicides; he is 
charged with crimes against the public interest (dêmosia adikêmata), and defends 
himself by arguing that he broke no law in practising his profession.
4
 On this 
 
1
 For an overview of stasis-theory see D. Russell, Greek Declamation (Cambridge 1983), 40-73; G. 
Kennedy, Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors (Princeton 1983), 73-86; L. Calboli 
Montefusco, La dottrina degli status nella retorica greca e romana (Hildesheim 1986). 
2
 See Hermogenes 60.19-61.3 Rabe. This case is found also in Sen. Contr. 1.2.23. A simpler 
variant in which the eunuch is prosecuted for adultery (RG 5.158.12-15, 7.217.21-4; Syrianus II 
114.1 Rabe) is evidently definition. 
3
 See RG 5.158.8-159.6 Walz. 
4
 See RG 8.407.14-16; the same case with a philosopher is found in Fortunatianus, RLM 92.26-9 
Halm. 
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analysis of the adulterous eunuch, the husbands appeal to the law of adultery is 
seen as determining the stasis as counterplea without further ado.  
Disagreement over the classification of a rhetorical problem raises the 
question of how stasis is in general to be ascertained. According to Hermogenes, 
one must inspect the krinomenon: if that is unclear, the stasis is conjecture (36.8-
9); if it is clear but incomplete, the stasis is definition (37.1-2); if it is complete, 
the stasis is quality (37.14-15), which in turn has manifold subdivisions. However, 
Hermogenes does not tell us what the krinomenon is or how one identifies it. The 
krinomenon also figures in the alternative analysis of the adulterous eunuch, 
where it is linked to two other concepts, aition and sunekhon, which make no 
appearance in Hermogenes. We know that the triad aition-sunekhon-krinomenon 
goes back to Hermagoras (fr. 18 Matthes); but the significance of the terms in his 
system is uncertain,
5
 and (as we shall see) in subsequent sources they are used in 
strikingly inconsistent ways. This paper attempts to trace the history of these and 
related terms, and so to throw light on changing conceptions of the fundamentals 
of stasis-theory from Hermagoras on.  
2. A Simple Model  
Our earliest sources offer a variety of schemes (I shall refer to them as 
Models) for the most basic analysis of a rhetorical problem. They agree that the 
analysis has a simpler structure when the question is conjectural (i.e. one of fact) 
than in other cases (Cic. Inv. 1.19, Part. 104; ad Her. 1.27) and offer a common 
account of that simple structure; their accounts of more complex analyses diverge. 
The complex analyses are not to be understood as elaborations of the simple 
analytical scheme applied to conjecture; each of these sources presents a Complex 
Model first, and appends the Simple Model as a departure from the norm dictated 
by a structural deficiency in conjectural problems. But for our present purposes it 
will be convenient to begin with the shared and more straightforward material; in 
this section, therefore, I summarise the Simple Model applied to cases of 
conjecture.  
A conjectural dispute has three components: the prosecutors claim (You did 
this) and the defendants counterclaim (I did not) together pose a question for 
the jury to resolve (Did he do it?). To provide a concise, neutral system of 
reference to help anchor the shifting terminology of our sources, I shall use P, D 
and J to designate the roles of prosecutor, defence and jury;
6
 subscript numerals 
                                                 
5
 See D. Matthes, Hermagoras von Temnos, Lustrum 3 (1958), 58-214, esp. 166-78 (with 
references to earlier literature). More recently: K. Barwick, Augustinus Schrift De Rhetorica und 
Hermagoras von Temnos, Philologus 105 (1961), 97-110; id. Zur Erklärung und Geschichte der 
Staseislehre des Hermagoras von Temnos, Philologus 108 (1964), 80-101; id. Probleme in den 
Rhet. LL Ciceros und der Rhetorik des sogenannten Auctor ad Herennium, Philologus 109 
(1965), 57-74; J. Adamietz, M. F. Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae Liber III (Studia et Testimonia 
Antiqua 2, Munich 1966), 206-21; L. Calboli Montefusco, La dottrina del KRINOMENON, 
Athenaeum 50 (1972), 276-93. 
6
 The parties to the dispute are called prosecutor and defendant for simplicitys sake; in some 
cases the first party might be a petitioner (e.g. a hero or tyrannicide) claiming an award which the 
second opposes. 
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will distinguish successive phases of analysis in the Complex Models (for 
example, D1 would be the defences initial claim, D2 its subsequent grounding). 
So the Simple Model can be represented schematically thus:
7
  
P1   kataphasis  You did it.  
D1  apophasis   I did not do it.  
J1   krinomenon  Did he do it?  
(It should be stressed that this and subsequent schemata illustrate the 
preliminary analysis of a problem. In particular, the notional dialogue is a device 
for clarifying the underlying structure of the dispute; it obviously does not 
correspond to the way a speech is organised or a trial conducted. The composition 
of a speech will not begin until after the preliminary analysis has been completed.)  
3. Three theories of stasis  
The Simple Model can be used to illustrate competing views about the 
location of stasis within the analysis. Three theories (I shall refer to them as 
Positions) can be identified:  
Position A: stasis is the initial proposition of the defence (D1).  
According to Cicero this was Hermagoras view: placet autem ipsi constitutionem 
intentionis esse depulsionem (Inv. 1.13). This is consistent with Hermagoras well-
attested definition of stasis as f£sij kaq' ¿n ¢ntilambanÒmeqa toà 
Øpokeimšnou pr£gmatoj ™n ú ™sti ti z»thma kaq' Ó ™stin ¹ ¢mfisb»thsij 
(fr. 10 Matthes).
8
 The defences initial response (I did not do it) is the 
proposition (f£sij) which counters (¢nti-lambanÒmeqa) the charge, and so 
constitutes the dispute as such. Cicero adopts this position himself in a late work: 
refutatio autem accusationis, in qua est depulsio criminis, quoniam Graece stasis 
dicitur, appelletur Latin status; in quo primum insistit quasi ad repugnandam 
congressa defensio (Top. 93). But in his earliest work he wavers between two 
other views:  
                                                 
7
 Since my main concern is with the Greek tradition, I will generally translate the terminology of 
Latin sources into Greek without comment (here it is inferred from ad Her. 1.27: intentio = 
kat£fasij, infitatio = ¢pÒfasij, iudicatio = krinÒmenon). Most equivalences are clear (e.g. 
status or constitutio = st£sij, quaestio = z»thma), but care is needed over the translations for two 
of our key terms, a‡tion and sunšcon. I accept Quintilians statement (3.11.5, 9) that ratio = 
a‡tion, continens or firmamentum = sunšcon. Sometimes ratio is glossed as quae continet causam 
(Cic. Inv. 1.18) or quae... continet defensionem (ad Her. 1.26); might the use of continere suggest 
that ratio = sunšcon (the equation stated e.g. in Caplans note on ad Her. 1.27)? The inference is 
groundless: firmamentum (= continens, continentia: Cic. Top. 95, Part. 103-4) is itself glossed 
quod continet accusationem (ad Her. 1.26), and Cicero observes that ratio and firmamentum 
equally continent causas (Part. 103). 
8
 Thus Prologemenon Sylloge (22) 329.10-12 Rabe (hereafter PS); with minor variants, (18) 
318.10-12; RG 7.173.10-12 omits f£sij and truncates after pr£gmatoj, and this shorter version 
also underlies Quint. 3.6.21. I note in passing that this definition explains why Hermagoras 
excluded nomik¦ zht»mata from the system of st£seij: nomik¦ zht»mata are perˆ ·htoà (cf. 
e.g. Hermogenes 37.17-20), and so do not grasp the Øpoke…menon pr©gma. 
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Position B: stasis is the conflict of the initial propositions of prosecution and 
defence (P1 + D1).  
Position C: stasis is the question which arises from the conflict of initial 
propositions (J1).  
Cicero seems to adopt Position C at De Inventione 1.10: eam igitur 
quaestionem ex qua causa nascitur constitutionem appellamus (cf. 2.15: 
constitutio, id est quaestio). However, he immediately reverts to Position B; 
constitutio est prima conflictio causarum ex depulsione intentionis profecta. At 
1.18 we read that the quaestio arises out of the conflictio causarum, in qua 
constitutio constat, which clearly identifies stasis with the initial conflict (P1 + D1) 
and distinguishes it from the question which arises out of that conflict (J1). The 
Rhetorica ad Herennium follows Position B: constitutio est prima deprecatio 
defensoris cum accusationis insimulatione coniuncta (1.18).  
Why should Hermagoras original Position have been modified in these ways? 
If the antilogical implications of his definition are overlooked, Position A might 
be criticised as one-sided. In isolation the defences initial proposition (D1) would 
be meaningless; one must take account of the prosecutions contribution (P1) as a 
co-determinant of the dispute. Positions B and C achieve that shift of emphasis.
9
  
4. Complex Models  
If the defence denies the fact, D1 will be I did not do it; if the fact is 
conceded, D1 will be (for example) I was justified in doing itthe stasis of 
quality. The question which then arises (Was he justified in doing it?) demands 
that the analysis be pressed further: on what grounds does the defence claim 
justification? So for staseis other than conjecture a more elaborate Model is 
needed. Although our sources are agreed on this point, they disagree about the 
shape of that Model. Ciceros rhetorical writings give three different accounts, 
each of which uses the terms aition and sunekhon in a different way. In this 
section I summarise the variants, and try to determine their historical relationship.  
(a) Model 1  
Ciceros earliest presentation (Inv. 1.18-19) can be summarised schematically 
thus:  
P1 You killed your mother.  
D1  I killed her justly.  
J1   zêtêma  Did he kill her justly?  
                                                 
9
 The antilogical implications of Hermagoras ¢ntilambanÒmeqa are noted by a later commentator 
on Hermogenes (RG 7.171.20-173.13), who infers (173.9-13) that Hermagoras agreed with his 
own adherence to Position B, as against adherents to Position C such as Minucianus (whose 
definition of stasis is attacked at 172.27-173.2). For this commentator stasis is not the zêtêma, but 
produces it: st£seij g£r e„sin aƒ ¢nwt£tw prot£seij... aÛtai dā sunioàsai poioàsi 
z»thma, 172.2-4). He quotes Hermagoras definition in the abbreviated form (see n.8); f£sij (if 
authentic) contradicts the plural prot£seij, and rules out Position B. 
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D2    aition For she killed my father.  
P2  But your mother should not have been killed by you, her 
son; her crime could have been punished without your 
committing a crime.  
J2    krinomenon  Was it right for Orestes to kill his mother because she had 
killed his father?  
D3   sunekhon My mothers disposition... was such that her children 
above all were bound to exact the penalty.  
The need to ground the defences plea of justification gives rise to a second round 
of conflicting propositions. Aition is applied to D2, the explanation for the act 
charged which the defence offers in order to substantiate its plea of justification. 
Sunekhon also belongs to the defence; it is D3, the defences strongest argument 
(firmissima argumentatio defensoris et appositissima ad iudicationem). Note that, 
by contrast with the Simple Model, there is a distinction between the zêtêma 
which arises from the initial propositions (J1) and the ultimate point for 
adjudication, the krinomenon (J2).  
This Model is coherent and intelligible. The analysis of a case has three 
stages. First one looks at the the initial positions of the two parties (P1, D1) and the 
question to which they give rise (J1). This allows an identification of the stasis of 
the case, revealing the nature of the dispute in the most general terms (whether it 
is about fact, name, or quality). If the dispute is about fact, the analysis is 
complete; ones task is then to marshal evidence for or against the contested 
factual claim. If the dispute is not one of fact, it is necessary to proceed to the 
second stage. The defences first proposition (D1) must be supported by 
circumstantial grounds (D2); this identifies the precise point on which the jury will 
have to adjudicate (J2). Thirdly, knowing the point on which the jury must 
adjudicate one can identify the defences strongest line of argument (D3). Once 
this has been identified, both parties can begin to work out the points which they 
will deploy to weaken or confirm that crucial line of argument. D3 is thus the 
sunekhon in the sense of the main or crucial point of the dispute.
10
  
(b) Model 2  
Ciceros second presentation, in Partitiones Oratoriae 101-6, is significantly 
different:  
P1       Opimius killed Gracchus.  
D1        The killing was legal.  
J1    zêtêma  Did Opimius kill Gracchus legally?  
D2   aition    I acted lawfully in the interests of public security and the 
preservation of the republic.  
                                                 
10
 See LSJ
9
 s.v. sunšcw 3. The usage is attested (e.g.) in Polybius references to the sunekhon of a 
treaty (2.12.3), document (3.27.1), agreement (3.29.9) or deliberative assembly (24.4.2). 
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P2   sunekhon   You had no legal power to put a citizen to death without 
trial, no matter how depraved.  
J2 krinomenon  Did he have the legal power to put a citizen subverting the 
state to death unconvicted?  
As in Model 1, zêtêma (J1) and krinomenon (J2) are distinguished, and aition is 
D2, the defences grounding of its plea of justification. But sunekhon has been 
transferred to the prosecution: it designates P2, the prosecutors attempt to 
undermine the grounding of the defences initial claim. The defences third 
proposition plays no role in this analysis.  
The example cited here (one of several in the Partitiones) reappears in De 
Oratore 2.132. The presentation is highly condensed, and technical terminology is 
suppressed. This makes it impossible to say with certainty that we are dealing here 
as in the Partitiones with Model 2; but the two texts may be close in date,
11
 and 
since they both omit D3 (by contrast with Model 1) and place P2 after D2 (by 
contrast with Model 3), it seems likely that the same Model is assumed in both.  
The anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium also embodies a variant of Model 2 
(1.26):  
P1        Orestes killed his mother.  
D1        I killed her justly.  
D2 aition    For she killed my father.  
P2 sunekhon   But she should not have been killed by you, or been 
punished without trial.  
J2 krinomenon  Given that Orestes claims to have killed his mother to 
avenge his father, was it right that Clytaemnestra was 
killed without trial and by her son?  
This scheme is structurally identical to that in the Partitiones, except that no 
account is taken of an initial zêtêma (J1); from the first propositions one proceeds 
immediately to determining the aition.  
(c) Model 3  
At the very end of his life, Cicero offered a further account (Topica 93-5).
12
 
The presentation is very compressed, and no example is elaborated; but there is 
enough to show that we are dealing with a distinct Model. As in Model 1, 
sunekhon belongs to the defence (continentia vocentur, quasi firmamenta 
defensoris); but, by contrast with Model 1, sunekhon cannot now be the defences 
third proposition. This is indicated by the gloss quibus sublatis defensio nulla sit. 
Removing the strongest argument of the defence (D3) would not remove the 
defence itself; to abolish the defence one must remove the grounding of its plea of 
                                                 
11
 De Oratore is securely dated to 55 by ad Att. 4.13.2; on the date of Part. see B.B. Gilleland, CP 
56 (1961), 29-32, who argues for 54-52. 
12
 The Topica is dated to 44 by ad Fam. 7.19. 
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justification, i.e. D2. It seems, therefore, sunekhon has taken over the place (D2) 
which in Model 1 is filled by aition.
13
 In outline:  
P1        Orestes killed his mother.  
D1        I killed her justly.   
D2 sunekhon   For she killed my father.  
J2 krinomenon  Did Orestes kill his mother justly, given that she killed his 
father?  
What, then, has become of aition? There are no internal grounds for 
answering this, but one possibility is that aition has been taken over by the 
prosecution (P2); this would correspond to the normal usage in later sources. If so, 
the full Model would resemble that found in pseudo-Augustine (RLM 143.25-
145.33 Halm):
14
  
P1 kataphasis  The general is guilty of murder.  
D1 apophasis   The killing was lawful.  
J1 zêtêma    Was the killing lawful?  
P2 aition    He killed a soldier.  
D2 sunekhon   I killed him because he swore he would desert.  
J2 krinomenon  Was it lawful for the the general to kill the soldier because 
he swore he would desert?  
Note the changed relationship between the second propositions. In Models 1 and 2 
the defence substantiated its plea of justification, and then the prosecution tried to 
rebut it; now the prosecutions second proposition precedes that of the defence. 
The prosecutor substantiates his charge, and then the defendant substantiates his 
defence.  
(d) Hermagoras and his critics  
Can we assign any one of these Models to Hermagoras? Quintilian attributes 
to him the scheme summarised in 3.11.1-10, and this (as we shall see) is Model 1; 
moreover, he explicitly contrasts Ciceros adherence to Hermagoras system in De 
Inventione with the variant schemes in the Partitiones and Topica (3.11.18-19). 
Quintilian cannot have concluded that De Inventione follows Hermagoras on 
internal evidence alone: Cicero sometimes departs explicitly from Hermagoras in 
De Inventione (1.8, 12-14), and Quintilian maintains that Cicero misunderstood 
some aspects of Hermagoras doctrine of stasis (3.6.58-60). Quintilian therefore 
had an independent source for Hermagoras doctrines. It does not follow that he 
                                                 
13
 Compare the gloss on continentia = sunšcon = D2 here (quibus sublatis defensio nulla sit) with 
that on ratio = a‡tion = D2 at Inv. 1.18 (quae si sublata sit nihil in causa controversiae 
relinquatur). 
14
 Ps.-Augustine does not say that conjecture and the other staseis require different treatment, 
although none of his illustrations of this scheme are conjectural. 
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was right to identify Model 1 as Hermagorean; but his testimony cannot be set 
aside lightly.  
Against this must be weighed the evidence of pseudo-Augustine. This author 
remarks that Hermagoras sometimes used aition aitiou as an alternative for 
sunekhon; he explains that the aition (i.e. the initial charge) is the cause of the 
dispute, so that the sunekhon (i.e. the defences explanation of the act charged) 
gives the cause of the act which was the cause of the trial (144.30-145.6). If this 
explanation of Hermagoras usage is correct, he must have applied sunekhon to 
D2, which entails Model 3.
15
 The context bristles with references to Hermagoras, 
and there is good Hermagorean material in it; most scholars who have worked on 
this material have sided with pseudo-Augustine against Quintilian.
16
  
Quintilians testimony is, however, to be preferred:  
(i) Pseudo-Augustines preferred usage is to speak of zêtêma (quaestio) instead of 
stasis; he remarks that some use the term stasis (144.11-18). We know from 
Quintilian of rhetoricians who used zêtêma in place of stasis (3.6.2), but there is 
no doubt that stasis is a Hermagorean usage. Furthermore, it is only possible to 
substitute zêtêma for stasis if one adopts Position C; but (as we have seen) 
Hermagoras probably adhered to Position A. There are therefore significant 
inconsistencies between pseudo-Augustine and what is known of Hermagoras 
doctrines.  
(ii) In Model 1 three phases of the defence appear in the analysis, and only the 
defences propositions are dignified with technical terms. This consistent 
emphasis on the defence sits well with the corresponding emphasis in Position A. 
It would make sense if Hermagoras adopted both.  
(iii) A variant of Model 3 dominated later theory, in the sense that aition was 
normally associated with the prosecution, sunekhon with the defence. If 
Hermagoras proposed Model 3, he establishedin pioneering workthe 
dominant system for the rest of antiquity; subsequent criticism would have created 
nothing but dead-ends.  
(iv) It is unlikely that aition and sunekhon were selected as technical terms by two 
independent parallel processes; more probably, one of our Models established the 
terminology and the others represent modifications of it. It is easier to grasp the 
motivation for the change of Model 1 into Models 2 and 3 than for either of the 
alternatives.
17
 I suggested in (3) that Hermagoras adherence to Position A might 
be criticised as failing to take adequate account of the prosecutions role. 
Criticism of a one-sided emphasis on the defence might well prompt, as well as a 
                                                 
15
 If ps.-Augustines evidence is discounted, the statement that Hermagoras used aition aitiou as 
equivalent to sunekhon must be rejected, or else the usage must be reinterpreted in terms of Model 
1 (e.g. aition gives the ground of the initial defence = D2 and sunekhon = aition aitiou gives the 
ground of the ground = D3). 
16
 E.g. Matthes (n.5) 174-6; contrast Adamietz (n.5) 206-7. 
17
 Motivation is no problem, of course, if we are free to assume misunderstanding (e.g. Matthes 
(n.5) 176); but since Inv. and ad Her. attest lively debate over, and deliberate modification of, 
Hermagoras views, we should look for intelligibly motivated changes before resorting to the 
hypothesis of misunderstanding. 
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move from Position A to Position B or C, a restructuring of the whole Model. 
Models 2 and 3 can be understood as alternative ways of bringing the 
prosecutions role into greater prominence, and so achieving a more balanced 
distribution of emphasis between the two parties. Each, therefore, implements a 
well-motivated structural modification of Model 1.  
(v) I argued above that Model 1 is a coherent system; but despite its theoretical 
elegance, the Model shows signs of weakness in practice. It is striking, in 
particular, that in the second book of De Inventione Cicero makes no reference at 
all to the third proposition of the defence when analysing specimen cases; his 
practice follows Model 2 in everything except terminology. It is hard to see why, 
if Model 3 was original, any rhetorician would have added a component (D3) for 
which no practical use was found; it is easy to see why, if Model 1 was original, 
modifications should have dropped that component and cannibalised the technical 
term.  
It seems likely, then, that Model 1 was the Hermagorean original. One 
problem remains. The simplest revision of Model 1 is Model 2: the analysis is 
truncated, the unwanted third proposition of the defence is dropped, the spare term 
sunekhon is recycled. Can we account for the more extensive reconstruction 
undertaken in Model 3, where the order of the second propositions is reversed and 
the terms aition and sunekhon are exchanged? The subsequent dominance of 
Model 3 suggests that it was found more satisfying in some respect. The answer 
may be a sense that, even if the role of the prosecution has to be taken into 
account, it is the defence which makes the decisive contribution to the structure of 
the dispute.
18
 So it should be the second proposition of the defence which 
immediately precedes and finally determines the krinomenon; and it is this second 
proposition of the defence which should be the sunekhon in the sense noted 
earlier, the main or crucial point.
19
  
I conclude, therefore, by offering this (inevitably hypothetical) reconstruction 
of the early stages of the debate. Hermagoras proposed Model 1; and, consistently 
with its thorough-going focus on the defence, he adopted Position A, locating 
stasis in the first proposition of the defence (D1). His system was faulted for 
failing to take adequate account of the role of the prosecution. This criticism 
prompted Positions B and C, relocating stasis to the conflict of first propositions 
(P1 + D1) or to the zêtêma arising out of that conflict (J1) respectively. In addition, 
his Model for the basic analysis of a rhetorical problem was reconstructed. The 
                                                 
18
 Thus Cic. Part. 102 adopts Position B (characterising stasis as quasi conflictio cum adversario) 
but recognises that it is the defences response which determines the nature of the conflict, aliquo 
certo statu aut infitiando aut definiendo aut aequitate opponenda. In the second century, 
Minucianus (discussed below) followed Position C but likewise saw the defence as determinative 
(RG 5.8.22-3; 7.139.24-5). At a still later date (citing the fourth-century Tyrannus) compare PS 
(22) 329.22-4:... ¹ toà feÚgontoj fwn» ¹ poioàsa t¾n ¢mfisb»thsin, kaˆ æj ¨n Ð feÚgwn 
¢polog»setai, ¢nafa…netai ¹ st£sij. Even Quintilian, who argues that stasis is sometimes 
determined by the prosecution (3.6.13-19), accepts that determination by the defence is the norm. 
19
 Compare too the glosses on D2 quoted in n.13 above with the definition in Stoic theory of 
causation of the class of cause termed sunektikon: a‡tion oá parÒntoj mšnei tÕ ¢potšlesma 
kaˆ a„rÒmenon a‡retai... aÙt£rkwj di' aØtoà poihtikÒn ™sti toà ¢potelšsmatoj (SVF II 
121.25-8); cf. A. Long & D. Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge 1987), I 336, with 341-2. 
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simplest modification abandoned D3, which had proved of little use in practical 
analysis, and transferred the term sunekhon to P2. But this went against the 
intuition that the defence was the ultimate, even if not the sole, determiner of the 
structure of the dispute; so Model 3 emerged, changing the order and logical 
relation of the second propositions so that D2 was the sunekhon (the key point) 
immediately preceding the krinomenon.   
If this reconstruction is right, Ciceros successive changes of Model become 
intelligible: in moving from Model 1 to Model 2 to Model 3 he was not switching 
sources at random, but keeping up with the latest developments in theory.  
5. Collapsed Models  
We noted above that the analyses of specimen cases in the second book of De 
Inventione illustrate the practical uselessness of the third proposition of the 
defence in Model 1; another point that emerges from these analyses is that the 
identification of stasis may in practice be influenced by the second round of 
propositions (2.70, 73). But this is a paradox. All three Positions associate stasis 
with the first phase of the analysis; no two-phase model can consistently adopt 
one of the Positions and allow the second phase propositions to influence stasis. 
Indeed, where an explicit distinction is made between the treatment of conjectural 
and other cases, the restriction of stasis to the first phase of analysis is a logical 
necessity. The analyst must have identified the stasis of his problem before he 
considers the second propositions, since he will only proceed to a second phase of 
analysis (and so bring the second propositions into play) if he has already 
acertained that the case is not conjectural. In theory, therefore, stasis must belong 
to the first phase of the analysis; but the treatment of specimen cases in De 
Inventione suggests that this was hard to sustain in practice. Quintilian (3.11.15) 
records that there were some who thought the stasis of the zêtêma (J1) may differ 
from the stasis of the krinomenon (J2); applied to the case of the adulterous 
eunuch, this theory might yield the conclusion that the stasis of the zêtêma is 
counterplea, that of the krinomenon definition. But this approach to the problem 
conflicts with the assumption that any problem has a single stasis.
20
 In general, 
therefore, later rhetoricians were forced to collapse the two phases of analysis into 
one. In this section I examine a variety of approaches.  
(a) Quintilian  
The difficulty of keeping stasis bound to the first phase can be observed in 
Quintilian. In 3.6.13-19 he rejects Position A (which links stasis to the first 
proposition of the defence) on the grounds that in rare cases it is the prosecution 
which determines stasis. For example, if the defence alleges adultery in 
justification of a homicide, the prosecution may constitute the case as conjecture 
by denying that the victim was an adulterer in fact. (Quintilian could equally have 
cited the adulterous eunuch: the prosecutions denial that a eunuch could commit 
adultery constitutes the case as definition.) If stasis can be determined by the 
                                                 
20
 See Quint. 3.6.9, 11.8; this is not to deny that any subsidiary questions which may arise in a 
speech will each have stasis (3.6.6-12, 11.6-7, Cic. Inv. 1.19). 
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prosecutions rebuttal of D2 (the defences grounding of a plea of justification), it 
has clearly broken free of the first phase of analysis.  
To see how Quintilian copes with this development, we must pick our way 
carefully through the obscurities of 3.11. One apparent inconsistency confronts us 
immediately. At the beginning of this chapter stasis has already been identified 
(his inventis...), and the analyst proceeds to consider the zêtêma and subsequent 
elements of Hermagoras Model 1 (... intuendum deinceps... quid sit quaestio, 
ratio, iudicatio, continens). This is consistent with Position A (stasis = D1), as in 
Hermagoras, or with Position B (stasis = P1 + D1). But Quintilian has rejected 
Position A in 3.6.13-19 and Position B in 3.6.4-6. At first sight, the latter passage 
commits Quintilian to Position C: stasis is not the first conflict, but what arises 
from the first conflict. However, what arises from the conflict in 3.6.5 is not the 
zêtêma as such, but its species (genus quaestionis); Position C has apparently been 
qualified in some degree. A desire to qualify Position C is also in evidence at 
3.6.20-1, which questions whether stasis is what arises from the first conflict, or is 
in what arises; a preference for the latter option is implied by 3.11.2, where stasis 
arises from the zêtêma. But neither Position C nor its modification agrees with the 
precedence of stasis over zêtêma entailed by the opening sentence of 3.11.  
The exposition that follows, like the opening sentence, adheres to Model 1, 
covering zêtêma (2-3), aition and krinomenon (4),
21
 and sunekhon (9). At 3.11.10 
Quintilian notes that there is no aition in conjecture, unlike the other staseisa 
standard doctrine, as we have seen (Cic. Inv. 1.19, Part. 104; ad Her. 1.27). But in 
3.11.10-17 he reports and rejects the distinction between zêtêma and krinomenon 
in other staseis, insisting that the two are always identical. The distinction 
between J1 and J2 is an essential part of the structure of Model 1; in asserting the 
identity of zêtêma and krinomenon, therefore, Quintilian abandons the Model he 
has been expounding to this point. After a brief summary (18-19) of Ciceros 
different schemes in the Partitiones and Topica (i.e. Models 2 and 3), Quintilian 
arrives at his preferred scheme. In 3.11.19-20 he approves those who reduce their 
technical apparatus to stasis, sunekhon and krinomenon (verius igitur et brevius ii 
qui statum et continens et iudicationem esse voluerunt).
22
 Sunekhon has now 
acquired a new sense: in 3.11.9 Quintilian defined it as D3; here it refers to the 
combination of P1 (et quod Orestes matrem...) and D2 (... et quod Clytaemnestra 
Agamemnonem occiderit). Quintilian goes on to say (24) that sunekhon, zêtêma 
and krinomenon are all the same. The identity of zêtêma and krinomenon has 
already been asserted (15-17); sunekhon is included in the equation apparently in 
the sense that the conflict of claim and counterclaim is precisely the matter on 
which judgement must be passed. Stasis and krinomenon are not identical but 
agree (consentire, 20); this formula, which restates the claim (8) that there is 
always a single ultimate krinomenon to which the stasis of the case is tied, agrees 
with the qualification of Position C noted earlier: stasis is not itself the product of 
the initial conflict, but is in or arises out of that product.  
                                                 
21
 In 5-8 Quintilian digresses to review some variant usages and discuss the possibility of multiple 
aitia and/or krinomena. 
22
 The supplement <idem> esse (printed in Butlers Loeb) leads to incurable contradictions; 
Adamietz and Winterbottom rightly reject it. 
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Quintilians exposition in 3.11 is hardly a model of clarity, but its structure 
should now be discernible. He begins by setting out the original Hermagorean 
Model (1-10), noting that it entails a distinction between zêtêma and krinomenon 
(10-14); this distinction he regards as untenable (16-17); so he opts in the end for 
a radically simplified system (19-20, 23-4). In this system one first considers 
claim and counterclaim (sunekhon); this discloses the question on which the jury 
must pronounce (zêtêma = krinomenon): 
P1+2, D1+2 sunekhon Orestes killed his mother; but she had killed his father.  
J1+2 zêtêma = krinomenon  Did Orestes kill his mother justly, given that 
she had killed his father?  
Having pinned down the question, one can then identify the kind of question 
(stasis = genus quaestionis, cf. 3.6.5) at issue. The impracticability of restricting 
stasis to the first phase of the analysis has been solved, simply enough, by 
collapsing the two phases into one.  
(b) Lollianus  
Quintilians source in 3.11.19-20 cannot be identified; but a variety of 
parallels to his Collapsed Model can be discerned in later Greek theory. I turn first 
to Lollianus, a Greek rhetor of the early second century. His views are partially 
preserved in an important but cryptic testimonium.
23
  
The context is Lollianus contention that stasis is an accidental property of 
rhetorical discourse (sumbebhkÕj tù ·htorikù lÒgJ). He distinguishes zêtêma 
(which is like matter), sunekhon (like form) and stasis (like colour and shape). 
This analogy implies that stasis is inseparable (¢cèriston) from sunekhon, but 
not identical with it. Lollianus illustrated his point, but the illustration is preserved 
in a very cryptic form. There is a reference to the killing of a hero as an adulterer; 
but immediately after that two cases are mentioned, one a counterplea and one a 
definition; the difference in stasis is determined by the different quality of the 
persons involved. The case of the hero is a standard example of counterplea. A 
husband kills an adulterous hero and is charged either with homicide or (more 
aptly) with a crime against the public interest; his defence rests on the legal 
warrant for his act.
24
 There can be little doubt that the definitional case is the 
adulterous eunuch (the two cases being paired also in RG 5.158.8-159.6). 
Substituting the eunuch for the hero is a change of person, and it is accompanied 
by a change of stasis from counterplea to definition. The sunekhon in each case is 
the same (the defendant argues that the killing was legal since the victim was an 
adulterer) but the stasis is different; so sunekhon and stasis are not identical, even 
                                                 
23
 PS (22) 330.14-331.3 (at 330.27 Rabes supplement <oÙdamîj> destroys the sequence of the 
argument); see O. Schissel, Lollianus aus Ephesos, Philologus 82 (1926/7), 181-201, esp. 191-5; 
P. Richter, Byzantinischer Kommentar zu Hermogenes, Byzantion 3 (1927/8), 153-204, esp. 190-
1. On Lollianus: S. Gloeckner, Quaestiones Rhetoricae (Breslauer Philologische Abhandlungen 
8.2, 1901), 50-54; O. Schissel art. cit. and RE XIII/ii (1927), 1373-5 s.v. Lollianos (15). 
24
 Homicide: Syrianus II 129.19-22; RG 4.595.27-9. Dêmosia adikêmata: RG 4.587.23-4, 615.8-
20; 7.487.29-488.31, 490.27-491.27 (and probably in 7.234.25-235.1). 
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though they are inseparable. It follows that stasis, since it can vary independently, 
is an accidental property.  
Let us now consider Lollianus use of terms more closely. First, zêtêma. When 
Lollianus compares zêtêma to matter, this suggests that the zêtêma is the rhetorical 
problem itself, the facts of the case; in this sense Syrianus speaks of tÕ pr©gma 
perˆ oá ¹ st£sij, toutšsti tÕ z»thma, which is also called prÒblhma, Óroj, 
ØpÒqesij, melšth, pl£sma or gÚmnasma (II 58.3-17; cf. e.g. Hermogenes 36.7: 
pantÕj oØtinosoàn proteqšntoj zht»matoj...). The cases of the adulterous hero 
and eunuch are different zêtêmatadifferent bodies of mattersince the facts of 
the case are different; but they receive the same form from their shared sunekhon; 
and yet the stasis differs in each. So zêtêma is not applied here to a preliminary 
question arising out of the conflict of first propositions, as in the original Complex 
Models. But if that preliminary question is dropped, it is at least possible that 
Lollianus has collapsed the two phases into one, as did Quintilians source. What 
of sunekhon? I have been assuming that this refers to the defence. Quintilian 
surmised (mihi videntur, 3.11.20) that in his source for the Collapsed Model the 
term subsumes both prosecution and defence, but Lollianus is unlikely to have 
followed suit. This would be self-evident if the charge in his version of the 
adulterous hero was crime against the public interest. The prosecution will then 
allege you harmed the public interest by killing him, but in the case of the 
eunuch you killed him; these different allegations cannot be included in the 
sunekhon, which (in Lollianus view) is the same in each case. But even if the 
charge in the case of the adulterous hero was homicide, the extension of sunekhon 
to include the prosecution is implausible. It is hard to see how the stasis could be 
differentiated if both prosecution and defence were identical in the two cases; 
there must be some reference to the difference of person (you killed him although 
he was a hero, you killed him although he was a eunuch) if the analyst is to get 
a grip on the difference of stasis. Sunekhon must, therefore, refer to the defence 
alone in Lollianus. So if (as I suspect) Lollianus is working with a Collapsed 
Model, it is a collapsed version of Model 3.  
The doctrine that stasis is an accidental is attacked in a scholion on 
Hermogenes (RG 7.248.13-32) which makes contrasting use of the matter/form 
analogy.
25
 The facts of the case are (as for Lollianus) the matter; a reference to 
politik¦ pr£gmata ½toi zht»mata shows zêtêma being used in the sense of the 
theme or problem, as in Lollianus. Paradoxically, however, these facts in 
themselves are ¢z»thta, that is, they lack zêtêma. What this means is that a 
rhetorical problem (zêtêma in one sense) needs a further ingredient if it is to 
involve a question or dispute (zêtêma in the other sense). This ingredient is stasis; 
for this commentator stasis is to the facts of the case as form is to matter. His 
thesis is, on the face of it, in conflict with that of Lollianus, for whom sunekhon 
was form. But the disagreement may not be about what gives form to a case, so 
much as about the definition of stasis. In Lollianus system stasis varies 
independently of sunekhon, so he does not follow Position A. The scholiast may 
do so; if, for him, stasis is (or is directly determined by) the sunekhon, his claim 
                                                 
25
 See Richter (n.23) 190. 
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that stasis is form makes the same point as Lollianus claim that sunekhon (and 
not stasis) is formnamely, that a dispute is constituted as such by the defences 
response to the charge. This is standard doctrine, as we have seen (see nn.18-19 
above).  
Lollianus assertion that zêtêma, sunekhon and stasis are distinct implies that 
other theorists equated all or some of them. As we have just seen, the equation of 
stasis and sunekhon can be understood as a modification of Position A; stasis is 
the first proposition of the defence; if the two phases of analysis are collapsed into 
one, then sunekhon, taken in an extended sense (= D1+2), is the first proposition of 
the defence. The equation of stasis and zêtêma recalls Position C, except that if 
the two-phase structure is collapsed zêtêma will now be identical with 
krinomenon. It is possible that Lollianus is opposing these two distinct equations 
of stasis (with sunekhon and zêtêma respectively); a triple equation would be 
harder to interpret. Taking our cue from Quintilian 3.11.24, we might say that the 
defences claim (e.g. I killed her justly because she killed my father) is what is 
ultimately subjected to adjudication; thus the krinomenon is the sunekhon.
26
 Taken 
with the equations of krinomenon and zêtêma, zêtêma and stasis, the circle would 
be complete. However, it is not clear that krinomenon can be identified both with 
sunekhon and with zêtêma without equivocation; so this triple equation remains 
somewhat speculative.  
It is perhaps worth noting that the variant of Position A evidenced in the 
equation of stasis and sunekhon may provide a clue to the rival interpretation of 
the adulterous eunuch as counterplea. This view depends on the analysis being 
truncated before arguments about whether a eunuch can be an adulterer enter into 
consideration. A theory which equates stasis with the initial proposition of the 
defence achieves this, even if the initial propositions are taken in an extended 
sense, so as to include the defences claim that the killing was legal because the 
victim was an adulterer. It is the inheritors of Position C who will carry the 
analysis on until they reach the real point of conflict between the two parties, and 
so bring to light the definitional aspect of the case. 
(c) Minucianus  
I turn next to Minucianus, one of the most important rhetoricians of the 
second century, whose work on stasis for a long time was more influential than 
that of Hermogenes.
27
 Minucianus defined stasis as the zêtêma constituted by the 
two initial propositions (tÕ ™k tîn prètwn prot£sewn sunist£menon 
                                                 
26
 This is presumably the explanation of Aquilas interchange of the terms sunekhon and 
krinomenon (Syrianus II 50.23-51.2): the defences claim (e.g. I killed justly since he was an 
adulterer) is the point to be submitted to the jurys adjudication, and the question arising (was the 
killing, given such-and-such circumstances, a legal killing of an adulterer?) is the crux of the case. 
Matthes (n.5) 171 and 170 n.3, infers textual corruption in the Aquila tesimonium; but Syrianus 
description of Aquilas proposal as a change (™nall£xaj) would hardly be warranted by the 
minor alteration to the definition of aition (= t¦ ¢p' ¢rcÁj ¥cri tšlouj, i.e. the events on which 
the charge is based, e.g. a mans standing beside the newly-slain corpse as the basis for a homicide 
charge) alone.  For Aquila see J. Brzoska, RE II (1896), 314 s.v. Aquila (6). 
27
 Minucianus: Gloeckner (n.23) 22-50. W. Stegemann, RE XV/ii (1932), 1975-86 s.v. Minukianos 
(1) is not consistently reliable on points of rhetorical theory. 
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z»thma);28 this is unequivocally Position C. We know from the scholia to 
Hermogenes that he used the triad aition-sunekhon-krinomenon, and that he 
applied aition and sunekhon to the first propositions of prosecution and defence 
respectively. We must now consider whether these first propositions were the first 
phase of a Complex Model, or the sole phase of a Collapsed Model (in which case 
the identity of stasis and zêtêma will entail the idenity of stasis and krinomenon as 
well).  
The external evidence is conflicting. When the Hermogenes scholia want to 
explain Minucianus usage of aition and sunekhon, they tend to use examples at 
the level of P1 and D1 (e.g. You killed and I did not kill);
29
 this could, however, 
be a mere shorthand. More telling is a summary of Minucianus definition (PS 
(22) 328.13-21) which explicitly distinguishes these first propositions from the 
subsequent propositions used to support them (aƒ loipaˆ prot£seij, i.e. P2 and 
D2).
30
 Against this we must set Syrianus, whose summary equally clearly 
identifies aition and sunekhon as the extended versions of the first propositions (II 
50.13-23), giving a scheme like this (the case is of a rich man who constantly 
shakes his fists at his poor enemy, and is charged with hubris; the stasis is 
definition: does aggressive behaviour which falls short of an actual blow count as 
assault?):  
P1+2 aition    You commit hubris by shaking your fists at me, as if I 
were a slave.  
D1+2 sunekhon   I did not commit hubris, since I struck no blow.  
J1+2 krinomenon  Did he commit hubris?  
Furthermore, there is the evidence that Minucianus accepted the analysis of 
the adulterous eunuch as definition.
31
 The definitional aspect of this case is not 
revealed by propositions at the level of P1 (You killed him) and D1 (I killed him 
justifiably...); it emerges only when D2 (... because he was an adulterer) evokes 
a response from the prosecution (But a eunuch cannot commit adultery). If stasis 
of this case is identified as definition by the initial propositions, therefore, they 
must be the extended initial propositions of a Collapsed Model.  
The inference that for Minucianus aition and sunekhon had an extended sense 
is supported by considerations internal to his system. Minucianus had a distinctive 
approach to asustata (cases that are invalid because they lack stasis), which he 
diagnosed by means of deficiencies in their aition and sunekhon.
32
 To do this job, 
                                                 
28
 See PS (13) 206.2-5, (21) 318.13-15, (22) 328.13-14; RG 7.170 n.58, 7.172.27-8. 
29
 PS (13) 209.19-20; RG 7.139.22-5; compare Sopaters equation of aition and sunekhon with 
kataphasis and apophasis (RG 5.77.27-78.3, with 4.202.7-19). 
30
 This passage incidentally shows that the distinction between conjecture and other staseis has 
been forgotten; the illustration given is a standard example of conjecture (the man found beside a 
newly slain corpse and charged with homicide). 
31
 See Gloeckner (n.23) 49, quoting the unedited scholia of Nilus: ™peˆ dā polloˆ tÕ par¦ tÕ 
tecknikù par£deigma ™kbale‹n ™piceiroàsi toà Órou, ¢ntip…ptontej oÙ mÒnon tù tecnikù, 
¢ll’ œti kaˆ Minoukianù... 
32
 RG 7.139.19-40.4; cf. Syrianus II 50.13-15; PS (13) 209.17-18, (22) 330.10-11; Rufus 405.3-7 
Spengel-Hammer. There appears to be no evidence that any rhetor before Minucianus tried to 
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aition and sunekhon must include P2 and D2, since opposed claims at the level 
You killed him and I did not kill him leave open the possibility that the theme 
is asustaton (for example, the accusation might be groundless).
33
 We have, then, 
in Minucianus another example of a Collapsed Model.  
(d) Zeno and Hermogenes  
Collapsing the two phases of analysis into one removes a problem from the 
original Models, but arguably at the cost of triviality. Do the expanded concepts of 
aition and sunekhon tell us any more than that there are two parties to a dispute? If 
not, they have lost their function and might as well be abandoned. One rhetor who 
seems to have taken this step is Zeno. His work is known to us from Sulpicius 
Victor, whose primary authority he was (RLM 313.3-4); it is generally agreed that 
he dates to the second century.
34
 Zeno defines stasis as summa quaestio, ad quam 
referenda est omnis oratio (RLM 325.5-6); this equates stasis and zêtêma in terms 
which echo earlier characterisations of the krinomenon as the central point of 
reference for a speech (ad Her. 1.26, cf. Quintilian 3.11.25-6). To this extent, 
therefore, his views are identical with those of Minucianus. But he makes no 
reference to aition or sunekhon.  
Although zêtêma and krinomenon will, in general, be identical for Zeno, he 
recognises one exception. There is a special category of definition (called 
enkrinomenon) in which krinomenon and zêtêma part company: aliud quidem in 
quaestionem veniat et aliud iudicetur (RLM 338.19-24). For example: a man raids 
a cenotaph and is charged with grave-robbery. The krinomenon in this case is 
whether the man was a grave-robber, but the zêtêma is whether a cenotaph is a 
grave. Zeno regards enkrinomena as a species of complex definition;
35
 in Syrianus 
(II 100.7-20, 115.17-116.24) an equivalent category is counted as a variant of 
simple definition, but the substance is the same. One of Syrianus illustrations is 
the adulterous eunuch: the krinomenon is the killing, the zêtoumenon is whether 
the eunuch was an adulterer. Another commentator on Hermogenes (RG 4.532.6-
535.6) also uses the adulterous eunuch to illustrate this category, although 
                                                                                                                                     
integrate the theory of asustata with his Model for the analysis of themes possessing stasis; I 
suspect that in Hermagoras asustata were discussed and classified before the Model was 
introduced. 
33
 Admittedly inconsistency is possible. Fortunatianus presentation of a version of Model 3 similar 
to that of ps.-Augustine does attempt to identify asustata by means of kataphasis (P1) and 
apohasis (D1). It is perhaps significant that this attempt to integrate the theory of asustata with the 
Model (RLM 82.12-14) comes adrift from the immediately following survey of the four 
Hermagorean categories of asustata (82.15-83.9); for example, the category of impudens intentio 
mentioned at 82.13 corresponds to nothing in Hermagoras. Ps.-Augustine introduces the 
Hermagorean asustata immediately after his exposition of Model 3, but makes no use of the 
Model in defining them (RLM 145.34-147.17). 
34
 Zeno: Gloeckner (n.23) 103-8; H. Gärtner, RE XA (1972), 140-2 s.v. Zenon (9). There are (I 
believe) possible indications that Zenos work may antedate that of Minucianus; if so, the ancient 
testimony that the system of thirteen staseis (which Zeno uses) was introduced by Minucianus (PS 
(6a) 60.14-15; RG 5.8.21-2; Syr. II 55.1-3) must be treated with caution. I hope to discuss the point 
elsewhere. On Sulpicius Victor see O. Schissel, RE IVA (1931), 873-8 s.v. Sulpicius (106). 
35
 Compare the distinction in Sopaters treatise on division between œgklhma and z»thma in 
certain kinds of complex conjecture (RG 8.42.23-43.8, 51.5-16). 
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(surprisingly) Zenos cenotaph example appears here as an instance of 
straightforward definition in which krinomenon and zêtêma are identical.  
Stasis in this kind of case is determined by the zêtêma; the definitional aspect 
of the case (e.g., whether a cenotaph is a grave) determines the stasis of the 
whole. But there is one subtle difference between Zeno on the one hand, and 
Syrianus and the scholiast on the other. For Zeno, both zêtêma and krinomenon 
are formulated as questions, the answer to the latter (is he a grave-robber?) 
dependent on the answer to the former (is a cenotaph a grave?). But for Syrianus 
and the scholiast the krinomenon is not expressed as a question (e.g. did the man 
kill an adulterer?) but is the act charged (the killing). To put it another way, the 
krinomenon is identified with the underlying facts of the case (the Øpoke…menon 
pr©gma), not with any question posed by or about those facts.  
This brings us to Hermogenes. He cannot have recognised enkrinomena,
36
 
since these violate his principle that stasis can be determined by inspecting the 
krinomenon. But his criteria for identifying stasis (is the krinomenon clear and 
complete?) make no sense applied to a question; so his krinomenon, like that of 
Syrianus, must be interpreted as the underlying facts of the case.
37
 The 
krinomenon in the case of the adulterous eunuch will be (as Syrianus and the 
scholiast say) the killing. Of course, the fact that the victim was a eunuch is 
crucial to Hermogenes understanding of the case: that is what makes it a case of 
definition. So the krinomenon will be not the killing per se, but the killing qua 
killing of a eunuch as an alleged adulterer; to identify the krinomenon one must 
take the killing together with all its materially relevant circumstances.  
The question of how to identify the krinomenon comes down, therefore, to the 
question of how to identify which of the circumstances given in a rhetorical 
problem are materially relevant. Hermogenes provides no answer to this question; 
in his treatise the Model for the basic analysis of a rhetorical problem has 
collapsed to vanishing point. Hermogenes might well have shared Quintilians 
opinion (3.11.21-23): simplicius autem instituenti non est necesse per tam minutas 
rerum particulas rationem docendi concidere... Nam qui viderit quid sit quod in 
controversiam veniat, quid in eo at per quae velit efficere pars diversa, quid 
nostra (quod in primis intuendum), nihil eorum ignorare... poterit.  
                                                 
36
 W. Jaeneke, De statuum doctrina ab Hermogene tradita (Diss. Leipzig 1904), 145-6, and 
Calboli Montefusco (n.1) 88-9, equate Hermogenes category of incident definition (™mp…ptwn 
Óroj, 64.15-23) with enkrinomenon. This is a mistake. In Hermogenes example (a man dreams 
about the mysteries, and asks an initiate whether his dream was accurate; the initiate assents, and is 
charged with disclosing the mysteries to an uninitiate) there are two zêtêmata: whether assenting to 
the others statement was revealing the mysteries; and whether the questioner was still, after his 
dream, uninitiate. Both must be resolved in order to reach a verdict. In enkrinomena there is only 
one zêtêma. Once it is established whether a cenotaph is a grave, judgement on whether the man is 
a grave-robber follows immediately; no further investigation is needed. 
37
 PS (22) 330.13-14 equates krinomenon with Øpoke…menon pr©gma in a summary of Minucianus 
theory; but this is unique (Minucianus krinomenon is treated as a question by Syr. II 50.22-4; cf. 
PS (13) 209.21-2; RG 4.143.11-12, 7.140.1-3), and I suspect contamination with Hermogenes. 
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(e) Tyrannus and Syrianus  
Hermogenes example did not kill off the Collapsed Model; it can still be 
traced in the fourth-century rhetor Tyrannus.
38
 Syrianus took over Tyrannus 
definition of stasis, and illustrates it from the case of the rich man who asked for 
the life of his poor enemy as his reward for heroism; the poor mans death deters 
other poor men from taking part in public life, and the rich man is charged with 
crimes against the public interest (II 48.10-50.6):
39
  
P1+2       You harmed the city by killing the poor man.  
D1+2       I did not harm the city in killing someone lawfully made 
over to me as a reward.  
The latter is the phasis sunektikê and determines the stasis (in this case, 
counterplea).  
Syrianus second illustration is the man found by a newly-slain corpse (see 
n.30 above) homicide. Here he specifies only D2 as the phasis sunektikê (this is 
the met£qesij a„t…aj, that he was standing by the corpse because he wished to 
bury it), but we should not infer that he retained a two-phase Model. The variation 
between Syrianus exposition of his two examples suggests that sunekhon does 
have an extended sense; D1 and D2 are seen as a single unity, which can be cited 
in any of three forms (D1, D2 or D1+2) according to contextual convenience.  
6. Conclusion  
We have seen, therefore, how the impracticality of restricting stasis to the first 
phase of a two-phase analysis lead later theorists to collapse the two phases into 
one. But this in effect robbed the analytical Model of its point, and in Hermogenes 
the attempt to provide a theoretical substructure to the doctrine of stasis seems to 
have been abandoned. Hermogenes is left only with the substantive structure of 
the doctrinethe actual system of staseis, each with its recommended division. 
From the perspective of the practising teacher of rhetoric this approach makes 
sense. The practical value of Hermogenes treatise lies in the sophisticated and 
effective structures of argument which his divisions offer the would-be speaker or 
declaimer. In any case, the attempt to work out a substructure for stasis-theory had 
broken down: the Collapsed Model on offer in various forms in Hermogenes day 
had as little theoretical as practical value. But we should not assent too readily to 
Quintilians dismissal of the more elaborate schemes. The perspective of the 
practising rhetor is not the only valid one. The concept of rhetoric as tekhnê, to 
which Hermogenes too was committed,
40
 implies a quest for understanding; the 
                                                 
38
 Tyrannus: Gloeckner (n.23) 89-90; W. Stegemann, RE VIIA (1948), 1843-7 s.v. Tyrannos (2). 
39
 Syrianus does not name Tyrannus as his source; the identification is suggested by PS (22) 
329.17-20 and PS (21) 318.16-319.3, where the same definition is attributed to Tyrannus by name. 
(The modified form of the definition which is adopted there is found at (23) 339.6-9 = (24) 350.4-
11, and in abbreviated form at (13) 206.7-9.) 
40
 The allusion in the opening sentence of the treatise (28.3-7) to the definition of tšcnh as 
sÚsthma katal»yewn suggegumnasmšnwn prÒj ti tšloj eÜcrhston tù b…w (SVF 1.21, 2.30-
1, cf. Long and Sedley (n.19) I 259; Quintilian 2.17.41 shows that it had lost any distinctively 
Stoic flavour) has been recognised since antiquity. But Hermogenes seems to elide its 
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attempts of Hermagoras and his successors to work out a formal Model for the 
analysis of rhetorical problems, and so to provide a theoretical underpinning for 
practical work with stasis, were part of that quest.  
 
 
epistemological content in favour of an interest in the historical development of rhetoric (note ™x 
¢rcÁj... tù crÒnJ). 
